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EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE
PROPOSED FEDERAL WASTE EXPORT CONTROL ACT
James P. Cargas*
INTRODUCTION
The United States government's sporadic efforts to strengthen solid
waste export controls have generated limited results thus far.' The
Waste Export Control Act (WECA or the bill), introduced by Repre-
sentatives Michael Synar (D-OK) and Howard Wolpe (D-MI), offers a
practical remedy and provides a comprehensive approach to regulating
solid waste exports.2 The current version of WECA has its genesis in
legislation of the previous Congress.3 The current version, like its pred-
ecessors, remains before the House Committee on Energy and Com-
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1. See infra notes 36-74 and accompanying text (addressing the history of the solid
waste export problem in the United States).
On January 13, 1981, a "lame-duck" President Jimmy Carter promulgated Execu-
tive Order 12264 under his foreign policy power as provided by article II, section 2 of
the Constitution, and under his legislatively granted powers in the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-20 (1988)). Exec. Order No. 12,264, 46 Fed.
Reg. 4,659 (1981). This order required the Department of State to work with other
agencies and officials of the federal government to coordinate export controls "no more
restrictive than the controls applicable to domestic commerce and use." Id. at .4,662. In
contrast, the proposed Waste Export Control Act, seeks to set minimum rather than
maximum standards by establishing export controls "no less strict than those which
would be required by the Solid Waste Disposal Act if the waste were managed in the
United States." WECA, infra note 2, at § 2(b). On February 17, 1981, barely a month
after it was enacted, President Ronald Reagan revoked Executive Order 12,264 in its
entirety "to ensure that the Export Administration Act of 1979 is implemented with
the minimum regulatory burden." Exec. Order No. 12,290, 46 Fed. Reg. 12,943
(1981). See also Lutz, The Export of Danger: A View From The Developed World, 20
N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & PoL'Y 629, 645 (1988) [hereinafter Lutz] (labeling President
Carter's executive order as an example of an administrative approach to eliminating
the "circle of poison" problem).
2. H.R. 2358, 102d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1991) [hereinafter WECA or the bill]. Reps.
Synar and Wolpe introduced WECA along with 22 original co-sponsors. 137 CoNG.
REc. H3149 (daily ed. May 15, 1991).
3. WECA was originally introduced as H.R. 2525 on May 31, 1989 by Rep. Synar.
H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). It was reintroduced as H.R. 3736 on Novem-
ber 19, 1989 by Rep. Thomas Luken (D-OH). H.R. 3736, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989) (reprinted in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Reauthorization -
Part 1: Hearing on H.R. 3736 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazard-
ous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
180-202 (1990) [hereinafter Subcomm. on Trans. and Hazmat]). See id. (statement of
Rep. Wolpe) (explaining that H.R. 3736 changed the focus of the regulations in H.R.
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merce and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs as part of a larger
legislative effort to reauthorize the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA).4
Unlike previous attempts to control the solid waste export problem,'
WECA takes a novel unilateral approach in its extraterritorial applica-
tion of domestic waste disposal standards. The bill provides that the
promulgation of international agreements, as well as the granting and
revocation of export permits, must comply with standards "no less
strict than that which would be required by the Solid Waste Disposal
Act if the waste were managed in the United States. '' 7 In practice, this
standard will require the application of United States waste disposal
standards beyond American borders.
The application of domestic laws beyond a nation's borders raises the
international legal issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Under interna-
tional law, two independent sovereign nations may include any provi-
sion in a bilateral agreement that they deem necessary to further their
mutual interests, including consent to the other country's laws.8 Con-
flict may arise, however, when one sovereign unilaterally extends its
jurisdiction to regulate an interest within the territorial borders of an-
other sovereignY The potential conflicts raised by WECA greatly con-
2525 from the standards of the receiving country to the standards of the receiving
facility).
There are no substantive changes from H.R. 3736, except that H.R. 2358 would
explicitly. implement the Basel Convention. Telephone interview with Kate English,
Legislative Assistant to Rep. Wolpe (July 9, 1991). See infra note 231 (discussing the
Basel Convention).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1988).
5. See, e.g. Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1988) (setting forth
the guidelines for solid waste disposal).
6. See WECA at § 2(b) (stating the Act's purpose is to ensure that solid waste is
managed in a manner that protects human health and the environment). See also,
Handley, Hazardous Waste Exports: A Leak in the System of International Legal
Controls, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,160, 10,179-82 (Envtl. L. Inst. April 1989) [hereinaf-
ter Leak in the System] (outlining other legislative proposals to control the solid waste
export problem).
7. WECA at § 12002(b)(1)(C) (international agreements provision). This standard
is applied throughout the bill. Accord id. at §§ 12003(b)(8) (permit application provi-
sion), 12003(f) (permit determination by administrator provision), 12003(h) (permit
terms and conditions provision), and 12003(k)(1)(B) (refusal to grant permits
provision).
8. See Hannum & Lillich, The Concept of Autonomy In International Law, 74
AM. J. INT'L L. 858, 874 (1980) (discussing the restrictions on non-sovereign autono-
mous entities in entering international agreements),
9. SPRINGER, THE INT'L LAW OF POLLUTION: PROTECTING THE GLOBAL ENV'T IN
A WORLD OF SOVEREIGN STATES (1983). See D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, NA-
TIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE: THE PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIAL-
ITY, (1982) [hereinafter ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON] (exploring the extraterritorial ju-
risdiction given United States antitrust laws and how it affects multinational
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cern both international shippers of solid waste as well as other nations
with their own waste disposal regulations. For example, a receiving sov-
ereign may refuse to sign a bilateral agreement with the United States,
as the bill requires, and insist on importing hazardous wastes.' 0 Alter-
corporations); Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of
United States Law, 14 INT'L LAW. 257, 258 (1980) (noting that international backlash
can result from applying United States law extraterritorially).
10. WECA at § 12002(b). This provision requires that international agreements to
export hazardous waste must include:
(b) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.-(I) Any international agreement
pursuant to which solid waste covered by this subtitle may be exported from the
United States to another country shall at least include each of the following:
(A) A provision for notifying the government of the receiving country of
exports of such solid waste.
(B) A provision for obtaining the consent of the government of the receiv-
ing country to accept any solid waste shipment.
(C) A provision for the United States and the receiving country to ex-
change information on the manner in which any such solid waste exported
from the United States will be managed in the receiving country, including
provisions for the exchange of information with respect to the specific
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities used for such purposes in the
receiving country. Such provisions shall include mechanisms to provide the
United States with the information necessary to ensure that transportation,
treatment, storage, and disposal of the solid waste will be conducted in a
manner which is protective of human health and the environment and
which is no less strict than that which would be required by this Act if the
solid waste were managed in the United States. Such mechanisms at a
minimum, shall provide a means for the United States to gain access to
treatment, storage, or disposal facilities used for the management of such
solid waste in the receiving country in the event the Administrator deter-
mines such access is necessary to fulfill the Administrator's responsibilities
under this subtitle.
(D) A provision for cooperation between the United States and the receiv-
ing country on compliance with and enforcement of the agreement.
(E) A provision for biennial review by the United States and the receiving
country of the effectiveness of the agreement.
(F) A provision for review and revision or suspension of the agreement if
either party concludes that solid waste covered by this subtitle is being
transported, treated, stored or disposed of in a manner that is not in accor-
dance with the terms of the agreement.
(G) A provision which prohibits further transport of such solid waste from
the country of destination without the written consent of the parties of the
agreement.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (I), any bilateral agreement
concerning shipments of hazardous waste that has been entered into by the
United States and that is in force on the date of enactment of the Waste Export
Control Act and which remains in force shall be deemed to meet the require-
ments of this subsection for a period of two years following enactment of this
section. Any such agreement shall comply fully with the provisions of paragraph
(1) after the expiration of such two-year period.
(3) The decision of the United States not to enter into an international agree-
ment shall not be reviewable in any court.
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natively, a state may prohibit American regulators from inspecting
their disposal facilities, as the bill also requires."1
This Comment focuses on the extraterritorial application of federal
environmental regulations under WECA and the relevant jurisdictional
issues. Part I assesses the scope of the problem of solid waste exports
from the United States into developing countries. 2 Part II reviews the
history and present legal status of federal laws, as well as regulations
applied extraterritorially. Part III analyzes whether WECA will im-
properly extend the United States Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) regulatory authority extraterritorially and whether the interna-
tional community will accept WECA. Part IV examines how WECA
may be applied once it becomes law. Finally, Part V concludes that
international diplomacy will become more important to WECA's suc-
cess than the strength of the EPA's new enforcement powers.
I. BACKGROUND - THE SOLID WASTE EXPORT
PROBLEM
A. PAST ATROCITIES
Three highly publicized incidents, in which unscrupulous entrepre-
neurs exported hazardous materials into the Caribbean and western
Africa, strongly influenced the 100th Congress and each succeeding
11. WECA at § 12003. This provision states that:
[t]he Administrator shall make an inspection of a facility of any permittee and
of any facility used for treatment, storage, or disposal of any waste subject to a
permit under this subtitle whenever the Administrator determines that an inspec-
tion is necessary to ensure continuing compliance with this subtitle.
Id. See WECA at § 12002(b)(C) (requiring that bilateral agreements entered into by
the United States contain a provision allowing the United States access to treatment,
storage, or disposal facilities located in the receiving country used for the management
of the exported wastes).
12. See generally Comment, Exporting Hazardous Industries: Should American
Standards Apply?, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L & POL'Y 777, 785 (1988) [hereinafter Export-
ing Hazardous Industries] (discussing a developing country's disadvantages regarding
importation of hazardous wastes). Developing countries typically are in a poor position
to weigh potential benefits against potential harms resulting from their involvement in
the international waste trade, unless prior informed consent includes full disclosure. Id.
at 785.
The United Nations defines "developed economies" as those that include North
America, Southern and Western Europe (excluding Cyprus, Malta and Yugoslavia),
Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Africa. Transnational Corps, in World De-
velopment: Third Survey, U.N. Centre on Transnational Corps., at xvii, U.N. Doc.
ST/CTC/46 (1983). It defines "developing countries" as those that include Latin
America and the Caribbean, Africa (excluding South Africa), Asia (excluding Japan),
Cyprus, Malta and Yugoslavia. Id.
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Congress.13 The first incident involved Lindaco, an American corpora-
tion formed four days prior to submitting to the EPA a notification of
intent to export. 14 The hazardous waste disposal contemplated, al-
though illegal if done domestically, was not prohibited by waste export
laws.15 The three West African countries contacted refused the hazard-
ous waste and it was never exported.' 6 This incident, however, made
clear that if a receiving nation gives its written consent, informed or
otherwise,17 to receive the hazardous waste, the EPA and the Depart-
ment of State have no authority to intervene or to halt the shipment.' 8
The second incident involved the barge Khian Sea which criss-
crossed the globe for twenty-seven months with 15,000 tons of non-
13. See International Export of U.S. Waste: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on En-
vironment, Energy, and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Government Oper-
ations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, 287 (1988) [hereinafter Subcomm. on Environment.
Energy, and Natural Resources] (discussing the impact of the export of hazardous
waste from the United States into foreign countries); Tiemann, Waste Exports: US.
and International Efforts to Control Transboundary Movement, CRS ISSUE BRIEF,
IB89123 (updated Sept. 5, 1990), at CRS-1 [hereinafter Tiemann] (stating that recent
events have given a sense of urgency to policy makers); Ticmann, Waste Exports: US.
and International Efforts to Control Transboundary Movement, CRS ISSUE BRIEF,
IB89123 (updated March 21, 1991), at CRS-2-3 [hereinafter Tiemann Update] (trac-
ing heightened congressional interest back to several highly publicized events in 1986).
14. Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, supra note 13, at
276 (statement of Sheldon Meyers, Acting Associate Administrator for International
Activities, Environmental Protection Agency). The obligation to notify the EPA of in-
tent to export waste was first legislated in 1976. See Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1988) (requiring exporters to notify the EPA of their
intent to export hazardous waste). The requirement that exporters of hazardous materi-
als notify the EPA of their intent to export sixty days in advance, codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 262.53 (1990), was promulgated in 1980 with other EPA export regulations. Hack-
ett, An Assessment of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 5 AMi. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 291,
300 n.43 (1990) [hereinafter Hackett].
15. Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, supra note 13, at
283 (statement of Sheldon Meyers).
16. Id. at 276-77 (statement of Sheldon Meyers). The three countries were Guinea,
Congo, and Guinea-Bissau. Id.
17. 42 U.S.C § 6938 (1988) requires that the receiving country provide written
consent to the EPA before the EPA issues an export license. See Hackett, supra note
14, at 300 (pointing out that Congress amended this provision of RCRA in 1984).
18. Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, supra note 13, at
283 (statement of Sheldon Meyers). In response to a hypothetical posed by Rep. Synar
(D-OK) in which the export was clearly unacceptable under United States standards,
Meyers stated that the EPA is:
constrained by the terms of the law. If the notification comes in, it's correctly
filled out, we're obligated to cable it through the State Department to the gov-
ernment on the receiving end and if after they're willing to accept it, we have no
legal mechanism to say that it should not go out to the country.
1992]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
hazardous incinerator ash19 from the city of Philadelphia. 20 Eleven dif-
ferent countries rejected the Khian Sea and its cargo.2 When the ship
reached the Indian Ocean, its cargo suddenly "disappeared. ' 22 Along
the way, the Khian Sea's captain disposed of 2,000 tons of the ash on a
Haitian beach, creating an environmental hazard.23 Observers assume
that the remainder was disposed of somewhere in the Indian Ocean.
Philadelphia disavowed any responsibility or control over these events,
claiming that under the terms of the disposal contract the responsibility
for ultimate disposal lay with the shipper.2 5 Furthermore, the EPA
found itself powerless to determine the final disposition of the ash be-
19. See Lief, Barnes, and Zulueta, Dirty Job, Sweet Profits, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REPORTS, Nov. 21, 1988, at 54, 56 [hereinafter U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORTS] (ex-
plaining that although the EPA classifies incinerator ash as "non-hazardous," the ash
often contains lead, mercury, and dangerous toxins). See also Subcomm. on Environ-
ment, Energy, and Natural Resources, supra note 13, at 35 (statement of Rep. Synar)
(noting that even though the EPA classifies the Khian Sea's ash as non-hazardous
under RCRA, the ash "still requires care in handling"). For a legal analysis of this
distinction between hazardous and non-hazardous waste in the context of exports, see
Comment, United States' Waste Export Control Program: Burying Our Neighbors in
Garbage, 40 AM. U.L. REv. 885, 890-92 (1991) (cautioning that not all non-hazardous
waste is hazard-free); Gilmore, The Export of Nonhazardous Waste, 19 ENVTL. L.
879 (1989) [hereinafter Gilmore] (discussing the problems and solutions associated
with non-hazardous waste); Lutz, supra note 1, at 635-38 (1988) (explaining the diffi-
culties regulators encounter from an unstable definition of "hazardous technologies").
20. See U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORTS, supra note 19, at 54-56 (recounting the
events surrounding the Khian Sea incident).
21. Id. at 56. The Khian Sea tried to get its cargo accepted by authorities in the
Bahamas, Honduras, Puerto Rico, Antilles, Dominican Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Ja-
maica, Panama, Caymen Islands, Haiti, and The Cape Verde Islands before reaching
its final destination in the Indian Ocean. Id. See Subcomm. on Environment, Energy,
and Natural Resources, supra note 13, at 35 (statement of Rep. Synar) (reporting the
factual basis underlying the Khian Sea incident).
22. See Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, supra note
13, at 34-270 (containing the entire record, including embassy communications, chemi-
cal analysis of the ash dumped in Haiti, and the Khian Sea's manifests, as well as
testimony from representatives of the EPA and the City of Philadelphia); Gilmore,
supra note 19, at 879-83 (detailing events from what the author terms the Philadelphia
Experience); U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORTS, supra note 19, at 54 (examining the
lucrative economics behind Khian Sea schemes in which "waste brokers still find ways
to clean up").
23. U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORTS, supra note 19, at 56. Some analysts estimate
that as much as 4,500 tons were dumped near the port of Gonaives, Haiti. Gilmore,
supra note 19, at 880. As of June 1991, the ash remains on the same Haitian beach
frustrating local officials who still demand its removal by the United States. Press Con-
ference Statement by Representative Ed Towns (D-NY) in Rayburn House Office
Bldg. 2 (June 6, 1991) [hereinafter Rep. Towns].
24. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORTS, supra note 19, at 56.
25. Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, supra note 13, at
37 (statement of Bruce Gledhill, Deputy Streets Commissioner, Department of Streets,
City of Philadelphia, PA). Rep. John Conyers (D-MI), however, was disturbed that the
"City of Brotherly Love" felt no obligation whatsoever for the ash dumped on the
shores of Haiti. Id. at 255.
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cause the Khian Sea's operators, Coastal Carriers Corporation
(Coastal), ignored the Agency's requests for information.26
The third incident also involved an incinerator ash shipment from
Philadelphia. Under contract with the Norwegian shipping company,
A.S. Bulkhandling, Philadelphia planned to ship 250,000 tons of incin-
erator ash to Panama for use as a roadbed in an inland wetlands re-
gion.27 Prior to beginning deliveries, Philadelphia attempted to verify
the Panamanian municipality's consent.28 After 30,000 tons had been
transferred to the shipper, however, higher Panamanian officials denied
consent and blocked the shipment.29 A.S. Bulkhandling loaded half of
this ash onto the S.S. Bark and exported it to an island quarry in
Guinea off the West African coast. 30 After the S.S. Bark dumped the
ash, however, the Guinea government demanded the ash's immediate
removal.3 1 Only the intervention of the Norwegian government pre-
vented an international incident.32
While these events reflect the impotence of United States export reg-
ulations on solid waste, they were unique only in the amount of public-
26. Id. at 243. During congressional hearings before the House Subcommittee on
Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, Adam Kushner, EPA Region III Office
of the Regional Counsel, admitted that the EPA had no "legal handle" to compel
Coastal to provide the information. Id.
27. Gilmore, supra note 19, at 881-82. The conditions of the disposal would not
have been allowed within the United States. See Subcomm. on Environment. Energy.
and Natural Resources, supra note 13, at 244 (listing exchange between Rep. William
Clinger (R-PA) and Bruce Gledhill, Deputy Streets Commissioner, Department of
Streets, City of Philadelphia, PA). In fact, when asked by A.S. Bulkhandling to issue a
statement regarding the non-hazardous nature of the ash, the EPA refused, stating that
the ash may present a hazard once in the ecological system. Id.
28. See Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, supra note
13, at 37 (statement of Bruce Gledhill) (explaining that Gledhill accompanied a con-
tingent of contractor representatives to Panama to verify that the contractor had the
authority represented in the contract).
29. Gilmore, supra note 19, at 882.
30. Id. The other half was sent to a qualified landfill in Ohio for disposal. Id.
31. Id.; Klein, No Dumping Zone: Africa and Greenpeace Fight US. Waste
Dumping, THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE, July 7, 1988. While Guinea originally consented
to the dumping, the entrance of foreign waste into the country violated a two-year
prohibition against such activity. CENTER OF INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING & B. Moy-
ERs, GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND: THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN HAZARDOUS
WASTE, at 26-27 [hereinafter GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND].
32. See GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND, supra note 31, at 27 (explaining how Guinean
officials detained the Norwegian Consul-General until A.S. Bulkhandling arranged for
the removal of the ash to the United States). See also Comment, Issues and Policy
Considerations Regarding Hazardous Waste Exports, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 373, 376
(1989) (relating how Nigeria detained an Italian ship until the Italian government
agreed to remove highly toxic drums abandoned by Italian businessmen).
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ity they received.3" The United States has an ongoing problem control-
ling such exports.3 Its current hazardous waste export provisions are
fundamentally too weak to act as a deterrent.35
B. PRESENT REGULATIONS CONTROLLING THE EXPORTATION OF
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS FROM THE UNITED STATES
1. The Current Regulatory Regime
Congress authorized the EPA to regulate the export of hazardous
waste in RCRA. 6 Although commentators initially heralded RCRA's
"cradle to grave" approach to waste management as comprehensive, 7
Congress soon realized that international borders could frustrate
RCRA's extensive documentation and tracking requirements.38 Conse-
quently, in 1984, Congress passed the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments (HSWA) to RCRA, which included specific require-
ments for waste exports to foreign countries.39
33. Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, supra note 13, at
37 (statement of Bruce Gledhill, Deputy Street Commissioner, Department of Streets,
City of Philadelphia, PA); Leak in the System, supra note 6, at 10,179.
34. See Hackett, supra note 14, at 294 (remarking that in 1988 the United States
accounted for 265 of the more than 300 million metric tons of worldwide hazardous
waste and that Western Europe contributed 35 million metric tons in 1988). Id.
35. See Handley, Exports of Waste from the United States to Canada: The How
and Why, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,061 (Envtl. L. Inst. Feb. 1990) [hereinafter Exports
to Canada] (detailing illegal and legal solid waste export scams); Tiemann & Fletcher,
International Environment: Overview of Major Issues, CRS IssUE BRIEF IB89057,
Sept. 6, 1990, at CRS-6 [hereinafter Tiemann & Fletcher] (outlining the gaps in the
current program).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 262-263 (1990); see Hackett, supra
note 14, at 298-302 (outlining the EPA's statutory authority and regulations promul-
gated in accordance with this authority).
37. See GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND, supra note 31, at 9 (stating that under a
"cradle to grave" system financial liability for any future damage from the waste re-
mains with the producer). The EPA's manifest system tracks waste from generation to
disposal through the filing of uniform documents with the government. Hackett, supra
note 14, at 299-300.
38. See GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND, supra note 31, at 9 (noting that "[t]his legis-
lation provided incentives for sending waste abroad, giving manufacturers a way to
dodge their new open-ended liability").
39. 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (1988); Hackett, supra note 14, at 300. The regulations
promulgated in accordance with these amendments require that the receiving country
give written consent to the dumping. 40 C.F.R. §§ 260-262, 271 (1990). See generally
Comment, International Law and the Transboundary Shipment of Hazardous Waste
to the Third World: Will the Basel Convention Make a Difference?, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 393, 397-401 (1990) (presenting a brief overview of HSWA); Leak in the
System, supra note 6 at 10173-75 (presenting a detailed summary of United States law
on hazardous waste exports).
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Under HSWA, a shipper must notify the EPA sixty days in advance
of its intent to export.40 Subsequently, the EPA and the Department of
State must contact the intended receiving country and request written
approval to export the waste. 41 Upon receipt of written consent, the
EPA approves the shipment subject to any restraints imposed by the
receiving country 2 and RCRA manifest requirements.43 For effective
enforcement, these regulations depend on the shipper's truthful record
keeping to determine whether the waste arrived at its proper destina-
tion and in the proper disposal facility.44 If the EPA discovers either
that the waste failed to arrive at the designated facility or the waste
arrived with some discrepancy, the EPA requires the shipper to file a
series of reports explaining its actions.45 Nonetheless, the EPA lacks
the authority to block a shipment once the receiving country has con-
sented - even when the EPA knows that the receiving country is tech-
nologically incapable of properly handling the waste. 0
Shippers may also export hazardous waste pursuant to a bilateral
agreement between the United States and the receiving country.'1 The
exporters need not obtain written consent from the receiving country
40. 40 C.F.R. § 262.53 (1990). HSWA requires the shipper to provide minimal
information to the EPA. Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources,
supra note 13, at 14 (statement of John Martin, Inspector General of EPA). Martin
explained "[e]xporters did not provide adequate descriptions, because EPA's hazardous
waste export regulation is unclear on how much information the exporter has to provide
in such a notification." Id.
41. 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(e) (1990). See Comment, Prior Informed Consent: An
Emerging Compromise for Hazardous Exports, 21 CORNELL INV'L L. J. 365 (1988)
(advocating that the current system of notification and consent be improved by also
providing receiving countries with detailed information on the nature of the solid waste
and its proper disposal needs).
42. 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(0 (1990).
43. See Hackett, supra note 14, at 301 (listing the RCRA's manifest require-
ments); 40 C.F.R. § 262.54 (1990) (articulating exceptions to general manifest re-
quirements of RCRA found at 40 C.F.R. § 262.2-.23).
44. 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.54(0, 262.55 (1990). The Khian Sea's manifests described
its cargo as "non-hazardous, non-toxic, non-flammable incinerator ash" on August 29,
1986, as "general cargo" on March 18, 1987, as "soil fertilizer ash" on October 26,
1987, and as "bulk construction material" on December 21, 1987. Subcomm. on Envi-
ronment, Energy, and Natural Resources, supra note 13, at 101-16.
45. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.54-.55 (1990) (requiring the shipper to file an exception
report with the EPA); 40 C.F.R. § 262.57 (1990) (requiring the shipper to retain all
records relating to the export); 40 C.F.R. § 262.56 (1990) (requiring the shipper to file
an annual report identifying the total amount of waste it handled in that year). See
also Hackett, supra note 14, at 301 n.63 (outlining other requirements of the annual
report filing).
46. GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND, supra note 31, at 12. See Rep. Towns, supra note
23, at 3 (stating that, "[u]nder our current law, if a government says it will accept the
cargo, then even if the EPA suspects that the importing country is unable to handle the
waste, the EPA cannot intervene").
47. 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988); Hackett, supra note 14, at 301-02.
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because the consent is expressly granted in the bilateral agreement. 8
The United States has negotiated such an agreement with Canada, 49
the largest importer of American solid waste,50 and intends to negotiate
more in the future. 1
2. Current Export Controls Leave The EPA Impotent
After an empty Khian Sea appeared in the Indian Ocean, the EPA
inquired into the ultimate disposition of the missing incinerator ash.
52
The EPA's inability to compel Coastal to supply that information ex-
posed RCRA's weakness: the EPA's responsibility and authority under
RCRA terminate at the American border.
5 3
The Department of Justice often uses other regulatory schemes to
prosecute international "midnight dumpers"54 in an effort to compen-
sate for these weak environmental laws.55 For example, Jack and Char-
48. Hackett, supra note 14, at 302. The receiving country may, of course, expressly
deny its consent to a particular shipment and negate the automatic provisions of the
bilateral agreement with regard to that shipment. Id.
49. Agreement Concerning Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste,
United States-Canada, opened for signature Oct. 28, 1986, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 598
(1987). See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Orga-
nizations, and the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22-24 (1989) [hereinafter
Subcomms. on Human Rights, and International Policy] (letter from D.H. Burney,
Canadian Ambassador to the United States, to Rep. Sam Gejdenson (D-Conn.)) (stat-
ing Canada's support for WECA in general, but also expressing reservations about
applying United States standards abroad, and the potential for United States officials
"inadvertently" infringing on the receiving country's sovereignty). But see Agreement
on the Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Substances,
United States-Mexico, opened for signature Nov. 12, 1986, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 25
(1987) (requiring express consent by the Mexican government for each shipment of
hazardous waste); Leak in the System, supra note 6, at 10173 n.36 (pointing out that
the Mexican treaty still requires written consent).
This Comment does not address bilateral agreements that expressly grant the United
States government extraterritorial control over waste exports. For an analysis of bilat-
eral agreements, see Exporting Hazardous Industries, supra note 12, at 789 (advocat-
ing international agreements as the most effective means of controlling hazardous
waste exports to developing countries).
50. See GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND, supra note 31, at 92 (noting that Canada
imports about 85 percent of all exported American waste); Exports to Canada, supra
note 35, at 10,061 (same). Canadian government officials estimate that the United
States exports nearly 150,000 tons of toxic waste to Canada each year. Id. at 93.
51. Hackett, supra note 14, at 302.
52. See supra, notes 19-26 and accompanying text (relating the adventures of the
Khian Sea).
53. GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND, supra note 31, at 40.
54. See id. at 2 (describing a "midnight dumper" as one who illegally dumps haz-
ardous chemicals in remote areas under cover of night).
55. Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, supra note 13, at
330 (statement of William Nitze, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of
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lie Colbert had a multi-million dollar scam in which they charged
many of the largest American corporations, and even the federal gov-
ernment, to remove hazardous materials. 6 The Colberts then sold these
same waste products to developing countries for a large profit, often
under false pretenses as to the exact nature of the chemicals.57 The
United States discovered this fraud when the Colberts shipped some
highly toxic chemicals under the guise of dry-cleaning fluid to a
Zimbabwean company that used funds from the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) for its purchase.58 These "pio-
neers" of the waste trade were convicted of twenty-seven counts of con-
spiracy, wire fraud, mail fraud, making false statements to the govern-
ment, making a false claim against the government, and one count each
of obstructing justice.59 Significantly, if the Colberts had not inadver-
tently received USAID funds, the federal government may have never
discovered their operation."
The first successful felony indictments under RCRA's export provi-
sions were delivered in May 1990 against a Southern Californian waste
broker and a Mexican truck driver. 1 The defendants transported haz-
ardous waste through American customs and abandoned the cargo in
Tijuana, Mexico. 2 The success of these convictions led to the creation
of a new interagency Task Force on Environmental Prosecutions. 3 The
United States-Mexico border has been described as a steady stream of
hazardous waste.64 Unfortunately, the conviction of one trucker in a
transportation corridor which annually handles 130,000 trucks at a sin-
gle crossing and a domestic interagency task force will not make any
detectable impact on this illegal waste export market."
State); Frontline Special Report: Global Dumping Ground, at 6 (PBS television broad-
cast, Oct. 2, 1990) (transcript available from Center for Investigative Reporting, Inc.,
530 Howard St., San Francisco, CA 94105-3007) (statement by Bill Moyers).
56. See GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND, supra note 31, at 34-49 (narrating events sur-
rounding the conviction of Jack and Charlie Colbert for illegal acts involving the export
of hazardous waste materials).
57. Id. at 35.
58. Id. at 42-43.
59. Id. at 49.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 51-56 (describing the convictions of Raymond Franco and David
Torres for exporting hazardous waste across the United States-Mexico border). See
also Leak in the System, supra note 6, at 10,174 (reporting successful guilty pleas
under RCRA Section 3017, 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (1988), in November 1986).
62. GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND, supra note 31, at 54.
63. Id. at 56. This new task force was comprised of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gations, the EPA, the United States Attorney's Office, the California Highway Patrol,
and Californian health department investigators. Id.
64. Id. at 57-58.
65. Id. at 51, 56-57.
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3. Current Export Controls Fail to Regulate Non-Hazardous Waste
Federal agencies and legislators focus on hazardous waste because of
its higher visibility and more dangerous effects.60 In their concern over
hazardous wastes, however, they overlook the dangers of non-hazardous
wastes. As a result, the existing waste export regulations do not cover
non-hazardous waste shipments.17 For example, because the EPA clas-
sified the incinerator ash exported by the Khian Sea and the S.S. Bark
as technically non-hazardous, the EPA did not require the shippers to
meet the requirements of HSWA. 8 Subsequent laboratory analysis of
the ash, however, revealed the presence of many toxins that pose long-
term environmental threats.6 9 At higher levels, the same toxins may
cause cancer, learning disabilities, and congenital defects.7
Many domestic and international organizations and governments dis-
agree with the EPA's distinction between hazardous and non-hazardous
waste materials.7 1 Furthermore, waste materials, which the EPA classi-
66. Gilmore, supra note 19, at 883.
67. Exports to Canada, supra note 35, at 10,061-62, 10,064; Tiemann, supra note
13, at CRS-1. The EPA distinguished between hazardous and non-hazardous wastes
according to guidelines provided by Congress in RCRA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(5),
6903(25), 6921 (1988) (defining hazardous wastes).
See also GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND, supra note 31, at 104 (noting that a "great
deal" of hazardous waste is unregulated). When the EPA's distinction is set aside, the
true amount of dangerous waste generated by the United States each year may consti-
tute billions of tons. Id.
68. Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, supra note 13, at
46-47 (statement of Stephen Wassersug, Director, Hazardous Waste Management Di-
vision of the EPA, Region III). Nevertheless, the EPA recommended that workers han-
dling the ash use protective gear. Id. at 53-54, 68.
69. See id. at 123 (reporting the toxins found in the incinerator ash); Exports to
Canada, supra note 35, at 10,064 (noting the "significant threat" incinerator ash poses
to the environment, and observing that there is scarce information on it due to its
exemption from many regulations).
The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the regional office of the World
Health Organization, analyzed the ash dumped in Haiti and found it to contain min-
eral silicates, aluminum, iron, calcium, magnesium, dioxin, and other toxins. Subcomm.
on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, supra note 13, at 123-24. The EPA
verified these results when it analyzed ash taken from the Khian Sea's hold during a
brief return to the port of Philadelphia. Id. at 123. Greenpeace also analyzed the ash
dumped in Haiti and found the ash to contain heavy concentrations of metal. Id. at
224. Although each study verified the existence of toxins, the PAHO and EPA con-
cluded that there existed no imminent threat to human health or to the environment.
Id. at 124, 135. The organizations also concluded that the ash's proximity to a wet-
lands presented a potential long-term threat to such a sensitive ecosystem. Id. at 124.
See also id. at 121-240 (reprinting all of the laboratory results and conclusions).
In another incident, 15,000 tons of a substance improperly labeled as raw material
for bricks was dumped on the Guinea island of Kassu. Hackett, supra note 14, at 297.
After the death of nearby vegetation, the substance was found to be incinerator ash. Id.
70. Gilmore, supra note 19, at 885.
71. Id. at 890.
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fies as non-hazardous, may become hazardous when a receiving country
lacks the proper treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. 2 Under the
right circumstances, almost all waste can be considered dangerous to
some extent;73 therefore, many developing countries have begun to
eliminate the distinction and treat all waste imports alike.7 4 WECA
adopts this non-distinction approach.
C. THE ECONOMIC PRESSURE TO INCREASE SOLID WASTE EXPORTS
Is BUILDING
In 1988, the world generated 300 million metric tons of hazardous
waste.7 5 The United States accounted for an estimated 265 million
metric tons, and Western European countries accounted for thirty-five
million metric tons. 6 In 1990, the United States singly increased this
volume to 500 million metric tons.77 As the amount of waste accumu-
lates, solid waste exports also increase.78 During the first half of 1988,
the EPA received 522 notices of intent to export - a significant in-
crease compared to the twelve notices that the EPA received in 1980.19
1. Decreasing Space Available For Domestic Disposal
A renewed environmental awareness has sensitized many Americans
to the presence of toxic or solid waste disposal facilities located in their
72. Id. at 890, 892; Hazardous Waste Management System, Exports of Hazardous
Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. 26,664, 28,670-1 (1986) (Preamble).
73. Gilmore, supra note 19, at 889.
74. Id. at 885 n.29. As of July 1988, sixteen African countries have made it a
criminal offense to import any foreign waste. Id. In Nigeria, it is a capital offense. Id.
at 886; Hackett, supra note 14, at 297.
75. Hackett, supra note 14, at 294.
76. Id. See Subcomms. on Human Rights. and International Policy, supra note 49,
at 2 (statement of Rep. Yatron) (stating that "[t]he United States produces some 90
percent of all hazardous wastes generated worldwide").
77. See GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND, supra note 31, at 103-04 (noting that experts
cannot gauge the exact amount of waste the United States generates and exports).
78. See Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, supra note
13, at 271 (statement of Sheldon Meyers) (describing the growth of the export waste
problem); GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND, supra note 31, at 52 (quoting American law
enforcement officials along the United States-Mexico border as stating that the border
traffic in toxic waste is on the rise).
Hundreds of waste export calamities have occurred in recent years as developed
countries "have found themselves overrun with their own garbage." Id. at 2. In 1988,
the EPA's inspector general issued a report which suggested that the waste export
problem is out of control. Id. at 11.
79. Subcomm. on Environment. Energy, and Natural Resources, supra note 13, at
271 (statement of Sheldon Meyers).
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communities."s Communities in which NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard)
advocates enjoy political support have prevented new and legitimate fa-
cilities from opening."' Consequently, the amount of space available for
waste disposal has grown at a slow pace. 2
Furthermore, as the United States generates record amounts of solid
waste, existing landfills and disposal facilities are reaching their maxi-
mum capacities and closing. 3 By 1993, 2,000 of the 6,000 domestic
landfills, which currently accept eighty percent of our solid waste, will
be closed.84 As available space diminishes, some states soon face the
threat of inadequate facilities for waste disposal.8  As a result, these
states have enacted protective legislation which prohibits other states
from using their facilities.88 New Jersey legislators passed such a law
when they realized that the New Jersey landfill space would be ex-
hausted within a few years.8" The Supreme Court, however, has held
these laws unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause as an imper-
missible economic protection.88
2. Increasing Costs Of Domestic Disposal
The renewed environmental awareness also encourages policy makers
to strengthen existing controls and standards that govern domestic
waste disposal.89 Stronger waste disposal regulations, however, increase
80. See Hackett, supra note 14, at 294 (noting that public concern for the environ-
ment sparked an increase in national environmental legislation).
81. Id. at 295. See Gilmore, supra note 19, at 884 n.25 (tracing the NIMBY
movement to the public backlash that grew out of the Love Canal incident).
82. Hackett, supra note 14, at 294.
83. See GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND, supra note 31, at 52 (attributing the dwin-
dling number of landfills as one reason why shippers illegally export more toxic
chemicals).
84. Hackett, supra note 14, at 294 n.14.
85. See infra notes 87 to 88 and accompanying text (noting protective legislation
enacted in New Jersey and Alabama, which the courts subsequently declared
unconstitutional).
86. Id.
87. See Waste Control Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:11-1 (West Supp. 1990) (prohib-
iting other states from using landfills located in New Jersey).
88. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-5 (1978). In 1989, amidst con-
cern that the state of Alabama was becoming the "hazardous waste dumping ground of
the nation," the Alabama legislature enacted a similar law. Lyons, The Garbage War
Between the States, FORBES, Oct. 15, 1990, at 92 (quoting Alabama Governor Guy
Hunt). The Eleventh Circuit, relying primarily on the ruling in Philadelphia, declared
this law violative of the commerce clause. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n. v.
Alabama, 910 F.2d 713, 718-22 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, - U.S. - , Ill
S.Ct. 2800 (1991).
89. Tiemann, supra note 13, at CRS-I.
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disposal costs. 0 For example, in 1980, disposing one ton of hazardous
waste in the United States cost approximately fifteen dollars, as com-
pared to $250 in 1989.91 In Africa, meanwhile, the current cost of dis-
posal for the same ton of hazardous waste is an estimated forty dol-
lars. 2 This stark distinction in costs reflects the economic incentives on
the demand side that strongly favor exporting America's waste to de-
veloping countries whose weaker or non-existing environmental controls
keep disposal costs low.93
3. Developing Countries Have An Urgent Need For Foreign Currency
The economic incentives on the supply side also strongly favor waste
exports.9 " With limited resources for economic development, the poten-
tial to earn large amounts of money influences developing countries to
overlook the potential health and environmental risks.9 The financial
rewards are so enticing that these countries cannot forego this trade. 6
During the past decade, this incentive has encouraged less developed
countries in Africa and Asia, developed countries like Canada and
England, as well as poorer European countries like Romania and the
former East Germany to supplement their budgets by importing
90. Id. See Exports to Canada, supra note 35, at 10,063 (attributing rising costs to
liabilities generators face in domestic disposal).
91. Tiemann, supra note 13, at CRS-2. See GLOBAL DUMPINr, GROUND, supra
note 31, at 52 (blaming costs as high as SI ,000 per barrel for disposal of some chemi-
cals as a cause of the rising illegal export of toxic chemicals to Mexico); Hackett,
supra note 14, at 294 (quoting domestic disposal costs as high as $2,000 per ton). The
economic incentive exists even for the export of regular municipal garbage. Domestic
disposal can cost a city between $80 to $126. Gilmore, supra note 19, at 884 n.24.
92. Tiemann, supra note 13, at CRS-2.
93. Id. at CRS-2. See Tiemann & Fletcher, supra note 35, at CRS-6 (explaining
the economic incentives to export hazardous wastes to developing countries). See also
Lutz, supra note 1, at 637 (viewing such an increase in hazardous industrial waste
shipments as a growing "time-bomb" with unforeseeable environmental impacts).
94. See Tiemann, supra note 13, at CRS-2 (acknowledging that some countries are
willing recipients of waste).
95. See Subcomms. on Human Rights, and International Policy, supra note 49, at
I (statement of Rep. Yatron) (describing an increasing trend for developing countries,
desperate for foreign exchange, to accept toxic wastes absent the capacity and re-
sources to properly dispose of the materials).
96. See Hackett, supra note 14, at 295-96 (noting that a waste importing country
earns substantial revenue). For example, Guinea-Bissau hoped to earn $120 million a
year for storing industrial waste from other countries, nearly equal its annual gross
national product. Id. at 295. Public protest caused the government to cancel the deal.
Id. at 296. See also Gilmore, supra note 19, at 884 (attributing the willingness to
accept waste imports for cash to the large debt burdens many developing countries
must bear).
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wastesY7 The need for foreign investment may also encourage these
countries to intentionally weaken environmental regulations in their
waste disposal industry. 8
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF EXISTING
UNITED STATES LAWS AND REGULATIONS
The need to expand the EPA's enforcement powers overseas raises
the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The United States has long ap-
plied its regulatory powers extraterritorially. 9 In fact, the United
States is one of the few countries that extend its regulatory powers
beyond its borders.1"'
Commentators advance several theories to explain this development.
One theory contends that because the United States legal system per-
mits courts to obtain jurisdiction over persons of another state under
long-arm statutes, 10 federal regulators, accustomed to this legal tool,
instinctively attempt to apply the theory internationally. 10 Another
theory proposes that the separation of powers doctrine has influenced
the United States notion of sovereignty to develop as a relative concept
rather than as an absolute one.'0 3 In any case, the fundamental appli-
cation of extraterritorial jurisdiction depends on the judicially created
Effects Doctrine.
97. GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND, supra note 31, at 10. In the next decade, concern
will continue for many of the new governments in Eastern Europe, which may be in-
clined to allow waste to enter their borders to boost their devastated economies. Id.
98. See Lutz, supra note 1, at 672 (estimating that 40% of all developing countries
have no laws that regulate hazardous imports).
99. Exporting Hazardous Industries, supra note 12, at 786.
100. See ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra, note 9, at 3 (noting that from 1905 to
1955, nearly every developed nation opposed the United States extraterritorial exten-
sion of its antitrust laws). Traditionally, nations based economic regulatory jurisdiction
on the principle of territoriality. Id. Territoriality has generally been defined as the
principle where "a nation may generally regulate the conduct of foreigners only within
its territorial boundaries." Id. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 comment c (1987) [hereinafter RE-
STATEMENT 3D] (discussing the principles of territoriality in domestic and international
law). The territoriality principle is the most common basis for jurisdiction in the inter-
national community. Id.
Recently other authorities like the European Community and the Federal Republic
of Germany have begun to apply their antitrust laws extraterritorially. ROSENTHAL &
KNIGHTON, at 3-4.
101. See J.H. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KUNE, A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE, §§ 3.12-
3.13 (1985) (explaining the source and application of long-arm jurisdiction).
102. See ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 9, at 14-15 (extrapolating that it is
a "short step" for American regulators, accustomed to extending their powers beyond
state borders, to also extend their powers beyond international borders).
103. Id. at 14.
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A. THE EFFECTS DOCTRINE
The Effects Doctrine adheres to the principle that the law of a nation
can no longer stop at the water's edge.104 The Effects Doctrine permits
United States courts and regulatory agencies to: (1) issue legal de-
mands on foreign nationals,"°5 (2) hold foreign nationals liable for legal
actions in their home countries,"°8 and (3) punish foreign nationals for
prior misconduct and future non-compliance with United States laws,
regulations, and court orders.107 The Effects Doctrine demonstrates rel-
atively little regard for foreign legal standards or foreign governmental
policies as long as the regulated act in question produces an intended
adverse effect in the United States.10 8
1. Goals Of The Effects Doctrine
The Effects Doctrine's underlying rationale is analogous to the long-
arm jurisdiction doctrine.109 Where long-arm jurisdiction depends on
minimum contacts for success, the Effects Doctrine depends on the ef-
fects of a person's actions.' 10 In many cases, the same indicia that qual-
ify as minimum contacts also establishes an appropriate effect."' The
Effects Doctrine, however, requires a less stringent balancing test 1 2
than the long-arm jurisdiction's minimal contacts test."13 The more
104. Id. at 42.
105. Id. at 12.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 12. Judge Learned Hand, in an antitrust case, articulated the Effects
Doctrine as follows: "[Ilt is settled law ... that any state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has conse-
quences within its borders which the state reprehends." United States v. Aluminum Co.
[ALCOA] of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
The Effects Doctrine's underlying rationale has failed to restrict the extraterritorial
application of United States law because courts impute intent from conduct and other
circumstantial evidence. ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 10, at 9.
109. See ROSENTHAL & KNIGroN, supra note 9, at 14-15 (discussing United
States legal basis for applying its laws extraterritorially).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th
Cir. 1976) (articulating the need to balance international comity and fairness against
the interests of the United States in exerting jurisdiction extraterritorially). See also
RESTATEMENT 3d, supra note 100, § 401 comment c (differentiating subject matter
jurisdiction which defines jurisdiction for constitutional purposes based on a particular
link, such as minimum contacts, from jurisdiction to prescribe a transnational activity
which defines jurisdiction based on a concept of reasonableness as determined by bal-
ancing a number of factors).
113. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (enunciating
that where a Missouri company has "systematic and continuous" contacts within the
state of Washington, the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment and its goal
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rigid minimum contacts test of in personam jurisdiction has often re-
sulted in American courts failing to find foreign corporations under
their jurisdiction." 4 In comparison, the same slight contact within a
territory that creates an effect satisfying the balancing of interests of
the Effects Doctrine may not reach the threshold necessary to qualify
as a minimal contact. Therefore, application of the Effects Doctrine
can potentially expand federal regulators' authority."' Consequently,
foreign nationals frequently challenge the Effects Doctrine's results as
constituting an arbitrary abuse of United States regulatory power.110
Also similar to long-arm jurisdiction, extraterritorial jurisdiction
seeks to prevent "forum shopping" for foreign jurisdictions that do not
bar activities considered illegal in the United States."17 Furthermore,
extraterritorial jurisdiction permits a country to punish individuals for
of fairness do not prevent a Washington court from having in personam jurisdiction
over that company). Accord Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California,
480 U.S. 102 (1987) (rejecting in personam jurisdiction over a Japanese company by a
California court as an unreasonable and unfair violation of the Due Process Clause of
the fourteenth amendment, where the burden placed on the foreign company was great
and its only contact with the American forum was its injection of a product into the
international stream of commerce); Helicopteros Nacionales De Columbia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (defining contacts of a "continuous and systematic" nature
with the Texas forum, which the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment and
International Shoe require, as being more than the mere visit of the foreign company's
chief executive officer and the presence of a New York bank account).
114. Compare Asahi Metals, 480 U.S. at 113-16 (disallowing in personam juris-
diction over a Japanese company cross-claimed in a California product liability suit),
and Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 413-18 (disallowing in personam jurisdiction
over a Colombian company sued in a Texas wrongful death suit), with Consolidated
Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding jurisdiction
over a Luxembourg company to enjoin it from a hostile take over of a British company
with 2.5% of its stock owned by American investors constituting a "substantial effect"
within the United States).
115. See ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 9, at 32-33 (characterizing the
many federal agencies with potential extraterritorial powers as "semi-independent" and
increasingly beyond the control or influence of the State Department or the President
of the United States).
116. See id. at 14-15, 26-28 (outlining foreign criticism of the extraterritorial ap-
plication of United States laws).
117. See id. at 4 (acknowledging that strict territoriality can make it more difficult
for a nation to regulate foreign conduct impacting its interests).
Territoriality, the antithesis of extraterritoriality, can often lead to unfair results, as
Rosenthal and Knighton note:
The territoriality principle permits evasion by those so inclined. Illegal conduct
aimed into the territory from outside, especially by foreigners, may be difficult to
detect and deal with, for authorities whose information-gathering and enforce-
ment practices are territorially limited. Territoriality favors unscrupulous mul-
tinationals. They can 'shop' for a place to do business to evade the territorial
enforcement that their domestic competitors must accept.
Id. at 37.
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causing real injuries within another country's territory." 8 The usual
targets of an extraterritorial application of United States law are indi-
viduals who gain an unfair advantage from their position in an offshore
business haven. 1 ' In sum, the primary goal of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion is to reach these "offshore bandits" and preserve the scope and
usefulness of the statute's overall scheme.
2. Major Criticisms Of The Effects Doctrine
Foreign governments criticize the Effects Doctrine, claiming that it
permits the United States to trample their sovereign integrity.120 They
perceive the United States' extraterritorial application of its laws as an
unwelcome intrusion.12' Foreign nationals who deliberately refrain
from conducting business in the United States are especially disturbed
when American courts hold them liable for their actions outside the
United States. 2 These criticisms naturally derive from their stricter
adherence to the principle of territorial jurisdiction - the conceptual
antithesis of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
118. See Consolidated Gold, 871 F.2d at 262 (settling a civil antitrust suit brought
by a British company against a Luxembourg company where the "substantial effect"
for purposes of jurisdiction was the transmittal of documents by third parties to Ameri-
can investors holding 2.5% of the British company's stock). But see United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (denying a foreign national fourth amend-
ment protection against an unreasonable search by United States Drug Enforcement
Agency officers in Mexico where the foreign citizen had no previous significant volun-
tary connections to the United States prior to his deportation and, yet, the United
States prosecuted him as a drug smuggler under United States law).
119. See ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 9, at 35 (listing the various con-
texts in which the United States applies its laws extraterritorially). See e.g., Consoli-
dated Gold, 871 F.2d at 262 (enjoining a Luxembourg company from hostilely taking
over a British company where the Luxembourg company "had taken whatever steps it
could" to avoid contacts with the United States that would have subjected it to its
laws); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 991 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1018 (1975) (implying that the seller of common stock should have known that
some of its misleading prospectuses would have been sent to the United States even
though the prospectuses explicitly stated that the shares were not being offered in the
United States); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100. 113 n.8
(1969) (dissolving a Canadian cartel of American subsidiaries where their actions were
a clear violation of United States antitrust laws).
120. See ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 9, at 6, 15 (viewing extraterritorial
jurisdiction as a direct challenge and threat to the sovereignty of other countries).
121. See RESTATEMENT 3D, supra note 100, at 236 (noting that the United States'
attempts to restrain foreign subsidiaries of corporations based in the United States
often strains relations with other countries).
122. ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 9, at 28. In theory, if every country
enforced its laws extraterritorially, chaos would result since any person's action would
likely violate another country's laws. See id. at 21 (suggesting that extraterritorial ju-
risdiction should be employed with a "moderating sensitivity" to a foreign sovereign's
concerns).
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B. RESTATEMENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
Third Edition (Restatement 3d), has adopted the Effects Doctrine in
section 402(1)(c). 123 Restatement 3d recognizes the uncontroversial use
of the Effects Doctrine to justify extraterritorial proscription of such
acts as murder, libel, or product liability. 124 The Restatement acknowl-
edges, however, the controversy in using the Effects Doctrine as justifi-
cation for extraterritorial economic regulation.12 5 Restatement 3d Sec-
tion 403 applies a balancing test based on principles of comity to
resolve conflicts.126 It suggests eight non-exclusive factors to be bal-
anced in reaching a determination of reasonableness. 27 Although such
123. RESTATEMENT 3D, supra note 100, at § 402(l)(c). The full text of Section 402
reads as follows:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as
within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is di-
rected against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state
interests.
Id. at § 402. See Comment, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the Third Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 127,
138-41 (1988) [hereinafter Third Restatement] (tracing the origin of the Effects Doc-
trine back to United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945)).
124. RESTATEMENT 3D, supra note 100, at § 402 comment d; Third Restatement.
supra note 123, at 134.
125. RESTATEMENT 3D, supra note 100, at § 402 comment d.
126. Third Restatement, supra note 123, at 135-36.
127. RESTATEMENT 3D, supra note 100, at § 403(2). The balancing requires evalua-
tion of all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent
to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to
protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and
the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international political, legal, or economic
system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
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a unilateral balancing has been criticized, United States courts have
cited section 402(l)(c) to support using the Effects Doctrine in eco-
nomic settings.1 28 The extraterritorial application of antitrust laws rep-
resents the most developed application of the Effects Doctrine.
C. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST
LAWS
The development of a strong antitrust policy has influenced United
States courts to extraterritorially extend their jurisdiction to adjudicate
antitrust cases. They have not, however, always adhered to this view of
jurisdiction. In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 120 Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes refused to extraterritorially apply the Sherman
Antitrust Act.13 0 Justice Holmes concluded that the determination of
whether an act is lawful or unlawful depended upon the law of the
country where the act was done.1 31 To hold otherwise, he reasoned,
would be unjust, an interference with the authority of another sover-
eign, and contrary to the comity of nations.13 2 He also denied jurisdic-
tion based on the Act of State Doctrine which prohibits United States
courts from reviewing a foreign government's acts within its own terri-
tory.1 3 3 A mere two years after American Banana, however, the Su-
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id.
128. See Third Restatement, supra note 123, at 137 (pointing out that while re-
statements are not binding sources of law, they are often consulted by United States
courts). See e.g. Consolidated Gold, 871 F.2d at 262; Laker Airways v. Sabena,
Belgium World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 921-22 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
129. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). The American Banana Company brought a civil anti-
trust suit against the United Fruit Company alleging that United Fruit's actions and
influence resulted in American Banana's assets being taken over by the Costa Rican
military and subsequently sold to United Fruit with the help of the Costa Rican courts.
Id. at 354-55. The court saw the military action as a manifestation of the Costa Rican
government rather than of the powerful United Fruit Company. Id. at 357-58.
130. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-31 (1988).
131. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356. Justice Holmes summarized this view of
jurisdiction when he stated that "[a]ll legislation is prima facie territorial." Id. at 357.
132. Id. at 356.
133. Id. at 358. See Note, Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick and the
Act of State Doctrine: An Elusive Standard, 5 Am. U.J. INr'L L. & POL'Y 133, 135-49
(1989) (providing a detailed overview of the Act of State Doctrine).
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) codifies the principle of im-
munized state action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1 note, 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-1611 (1988
and Supp. 1991). Both the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine protect foreign govern-
ment officials acting in their official capacity. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (granting protection under the FSIA against ad-
judication in the United States for the bombing and destruction of a neutral Liberian
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
preme Court began to reject a strict territorial approach to jurisdiction
and moved towards adopting a legal approach based on extraterritorial-
ity."4 In 1927, the Supreme Court implicitly reversed American Ba-
nana in United States v. Sisal Sales Corp."13 The Court held that
United States antitrust laws applied to the actions of a domestic corpo-
ration taken within the United States, Mexico, and elsewhere even
though the success of the illegal monopoly depended upon favorable
Mexican laws and actions by the Mexican government.13  By focusing
on the actions of the corporation and its "forbidden results within the
United States" the court avoided having to apply the Act of State Doc-
trine to the actions and laws of the Mexican government. 37 This ruling
sparked fifty years of cases in which American courts extended United
States laws extraterritorially with minimal regard for other sovereigns'
laws or legal integrity.
138
ship by the Argentine Air Force in international waters). United States courts, how-
ever, refuse to apply these defenses to the foreign government's commercial acts. See
ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 9, at 33-34 (explaining how even foreign govern-
ments may be subject to the jurisdiction of an American court if their activity was
found to be commercial, regardless of possible political purposes behind the activity);
see also, Gregorian v. Izuestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
891 (1989) (denying a Soviet newspaper protection of the FSIA in a libel action
brought by an American stock broker); International Assoc. of Machinists v. Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], 649 F.2d 1354, 1358-61 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982) (denying extraterritorial jurisdiction over
OPEC based on the inappropriateness of the judiciary in a foreign policy determination
normally left to the executive branch, i.e., the Act of State Doctrine).
134. See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that the Sherman Antitrust Act was inapplicable to a British to-
bacco company).
135. 274 U.S. 268 (1927). See DeArellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1543
n.185 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985) (discrediting and distinguishing
American Banana on the grounds that the military incursion complained of was by the
United States military, not a foreign sovereign's as in American Banana); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1181 (E.D. Pa. 1980), affd
in relevant part sub nom., In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723
F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1983) (qualifying American Banana as "so eroded by subsequent
case law as to have been effectively limited to its specific factual pattern"); Shenefield,
Thoughts on Extraterritorial Application of The United States Antitrust Laws, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 350, 361 (1983) (tracing the erosion of American Banana over a
thirty-six year period ending with ALCOA). See also, Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Cogoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d Cir. 1979) (detailing the judicial history
subsequent to American Banana where American courts have actively applied their
laws extraterritorially); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1512-13 (S.D.
Fla. 1990) (summarizing over 186 years of applying United States laws extraterritori-
ally under the Effects Doctrine in criminal contexts).
136. Sisal, 274 U.S. at 276.
137. Id.
138. See e.g., Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 113-32 (awarding the civil antitrust plain-
tiff treble damages despite the Canadian government's encouragement to form an ille-
gal patent pool, and the Canadian courts' willingness to enforce patent infringements
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In 1976, the Ninth Circuit broke this trend towards expanding juris-
diction in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.39 The Ninth
Circuit initiated a degree of judicial restraint by applying a balancing
test to the Effects Doctrine.14 The circuit court recognized that, simi-
lar to the Act of State Doctrine, situations existed in which the judici-
ary should consider the potential foreign policy implications of its ac-
tions."' Thus, in addition to considering whether the defendant's
actions substantially effected United States commerce and whether
those actions violated United States law, the Ninth Circuit also consid-
ered whether, as a matter of international comity and fairness, courts
should extraterritorially apply United States law.14 2 The Third Circuit
in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congelum Corp.43 adopted and expanded
the Ninth Circuit's balancing test to include consideration of the conse-
quences to the foreign national.
1 44
By applying a balancing test to the Effects Doctrine, courts gain a
higher degree of discretion. As a result, subsequent courts have not
given the elements of the balancing test delineated in Timberlane and
Mannington Mills equal weight. For example, in In re Aircrash in
Bali, Indonesia, the Ninth Circuit held that a previous multilateral
brought by members of the illegal pool); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208-
09 (2d Cir.), affid in relevant part, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied
sub nom., Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (allowing the Securities and
Exchange Commission to regulate insider trading by directors of a foreign corporation
who conducted isolated foreign transactions of registered stock and traded on the
American Stock Exchange); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp.,
370 U.S. 690, 704-08 (1962) (holding American defendants liable for antitrust conspir-
acy even though its success depended upon the actions of the agent of the Canadian
government acting in accordance with Canadian law); United States v. Watchmakers
of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (holding
that an Act of State Doctrine defense would succeed only if an explicit Swiss law
compelled the foreign parties to engage in export restrictions illegal under United
States law).
139. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
140. Id. at 613. See ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 9, at 26 (applauding
Timberlane as one of the few times in this century that an American court considered
the possibility of accommodating a foreign sovereign's interests).
141. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
142. Id. The factors the court said should be balanced against the United States'
interest in regulating the activity are: (1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or
policy; (2) the nationality of the parties; (3) the extent to which enforcement by either
state can be expected to achieve compliance; (4) the relative significance of effects on
the United States compared with the effects abroad; (5) the existence of intent to harm
or affect American commerce and its foreseeability; and (6) the relative importance of
conduct within the United States to the violations charged as compared with the con-
duct abroad. Id. at 614.
143. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
144. Id. at 1297-98. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (listing the
Timberlane balancing test).
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treaty, which specifically addresses the adjudicated issue, is irrele-
vant.'45 The Second Circuit in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., freely
implied intent despite obvious actions by the defendant to the con-
trary." " The District of Columbia Circuit in Laker Airways v. Sabena,
Belgium World Airlines permitted a domestic antitrust case to go for-
ward despite parallel proceedings in a British court. 147 Each of these
holdings are contrary to the elements of the Timberlane-Mannington
Mills balancing test, but nevertheless supportable due to the discretion
courts have in balancing the different elements. The application of the
Effects Doctrine, therefore, remains at the mercy of a court's
discretion.' 4
D. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
In contrast to the extraterritorial application of antitrust law, Ameri-
can courts have been less willing to use their discretion to apply envi-
ronmental protection laws beyond the United States border. The judi-
cial discretion inherent in the Effects Doctrine permits antitrust and
environmental laws to be applied differently. An analysis of three envi-
ronmental protection laws reveals that the courts have often required
environmental laws to satisfy the Foley Doctrine which creates a pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application of United States laws. " "
This presumption is overcome by showing clear evidence of congres-
145. 684 F.2d 1301, 1305 (1982) (holding that the government unreasonably im-
paired an individual's constitutional right to recover property damages in a state tort
action by signing a multinational treaty that limits airline liability).
146. 519 F.2d at 991. In Bersch, the court held that the seller of common stock
should have known that some of its misleading prospectuses would have been sent to
the United States even though the prospectuses explicitly stated that the shares were
not being offered in the United States. Id.
See ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 9, at 12 (depicting the ease with which
American courts have implied intent).
147. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 950. In this case Justice Wilkey concluded that
international law and comity allow American courts to have extraterritorial jurisdiction
and issue injunctions free from foreign interference. Id. at 950-51.
148. Other countries' courts also exercise discretion in deciding cases based on
comity. For example, in litigation involving United States and French law, a French
court demanded that a United States subsidiary, which faced conflicting requirements
under both laws, to fulfill its contract obligations even though these obligations contra-
vened United States foreign policy. See Judgment of May 22, 1965, cour d'Appel,
Paris [1965] D.S. Jur. 147, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 476 (1966) (holding that Freuhauf-
France, the French subsidiary of the American multinational corporation, must fulfill
its contract obligations with Automobiles Berliet, S.A. to sell assemblies that would
ultimately be sold to the Peoples Republic of China against the orders of the United
States government).
149. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
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sional intent that a law have an extraterritorial application."' Analysis
of antitrust laws is devoid of this extra hurdle.""1
1. The Marine Mammal Protection Act
In United States v. Mitchell,"8 2 an American citizen, who worked for
a Bahamian company that captured and exported atlantic bottlenose
dolphins to England, was convicted on twenty-three counts under the
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).15 3 The Bahamian govern-
ment had issued the company a permit that legitimized such business
under Bahamian law."" In reversing the indictments, the Fifth Circuit
failed to find sufficient evidence that Congress intended the MMPA to
apply extraterritorially. 155 The Fifth Circuit ruled in this manner de-
spite the fact that United States laws illegalized Mitchell's act in the
United States, 56 and the federal government clearly possesses the au-
thority to control its nationals' conduct.6 7
The court in Mitchell examined the nature of the MMPA and deter-
mined that limiting the MMPA to the strict territorial jurisdiction of
the United States would not greatly curtail its scope or usefulness. 0 8
The court also believed that this restricted application would not im-
munize "offshore bandits" from prosecution. 8 9 Furthermore, the court
considered the Bahamian government's sovereign interest in controlling
its natural resources, i.e. marine mammals.' 0 Finally, the court recog-
nized the Bahamian government's sovereign right to strike a balance
150. Id.
151. See Turley, "When In Rome". Multinational Misconduct and the Presump-
tion Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 634-38 (1990) (stating that
while American courts properly focus on the territorial question in market cases, Le.
antitrust and securities, they focus on the clearly expressed intent of Congress question
in nonmarket cases, Le. environmental, thereby creating disparate results for extraterri-
toriality). See also Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 672-73 (S.D.
N.Y. 1991) (denying RCRA's citizen suit provisions extraterritorial application after
finding the legislative history and plain meaning of the statute void of congressional
intent overcoming the Foley Doctrine presumption).
152. 553 F.2d 996, 997-99 (5th Cir. 1977).
153. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1406 (1988).
154. Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 997-99.
155. Id. at 998.
156. Id. at 1002-05.
157. Id. at 1001 (quoting Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932), and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
30 (1965)).
158. Id. at 1003.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1002.
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between conservation and exploitation that substantially differs from
the balance struck by the United States Congress. 1"
2. The National Environmental Policy Act
In Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Stone,""2 Greenpeace' 63 attempted to com-
pel the United States Department of Defense to fulfill its obligations
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)' 4 within both
the territory of Germany and on international waters. NEPA requires
the federal government to prepare environmental impact studies (EIS)
for major federal actions "affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment."' 65 The United States Army removed chemical weapons from
German bases for storage and destruction at Johnson Atoll in the cen-
tral Pacific Ocean. 6 Although the responsible entities prepared an
EIS for the Johnson Atoll facilities and a Global Commons Environ-
mental Assessment for the chemical weapons' transoceanic transport,
no EIS was prepared for the chemical weapons' movement within Ger-
many."' The Federal District Court for Hawaii balanced the interests
of the United States in expanding jurisdiction overseas against the in-
terests of comity and fairness, and held that an extraterritorial applica-
tion of NEPA would disrespect German sovereignty because the
United States Army worked with the German government and the
German government approved the operation as not injurious to the
German environment.6 8 The court reasoned that ruling on the merits
would require it to second guess the President and the German govern-
ment.16 The court limited its holding, however, to situations in which
the executive, under his foreign policy powers, initiates a major federal
161. Id.
162. 748 F.Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir.
1991).
163. See Gifford, Inside the Environmental Groups, OUTSIDE, Sept. 1990, at 73
(describing the plaintiff, Greenpeace U.S.A., as both a giant public interest group,
comprised of 2.3 million members, and a multinational public relations firm that fo-
cuses on removing nuclear weapons from ships, and banning CFC's and toxins).
164. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61 (1988).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
166. Greenpeace, 748 F.Supp. at 752. Johnson Atoll is an unincorporated United
States territory in the central Pacific Ocean which contains the Department of De-
fense's Chemical Weapons Disposal System. Id. at 752-53.
167. Id. at 753-54.
168. Id. at 760.
169. Id. at 759-60. Since a West German citizen group had challenged the opera-
tion in the German judicial system, the United States District Court for the District of
Hawaii would also have had to review the wisdom of the West German court in deny-
ing its own citizens the very injunctive relief Greenpeace sought. Id. at 760.
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action in conjunction with another country.'70 The court suggested,
meanwhile, that an extraterritorial EIS may be required when neither
the federal agency nor the foreign country involved performs an envi-
ronmental assessment."'
The District of Columbia Circuit has also interpreted NEPA as uni-
laterally inapplicable to a foreign territory. In Natural Resources De-
fense Counsel (NRDC) v. Nuclear Reg. ComM'n.,72 the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit acknowledged the potential for American "regulatory
coercion" where export licenses were conditioned on health, safety and
environmental standards, which the United States sought to apply ex-
traterritorially 73 The court concluded that NEPA did not apply extra-
territorially and therefore, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was
not required to prepare a site-specific EIS for an American-made nu-
clear reactor located in the Philippines. 7 4 Similar to the antitrust
cases, 175 the court's analysis included a balancing of the national inter-
ests of each country. 76 Unlike the court in Greenpeace, the NRDC
court had no guidance from the legislative history of NEPA.17  The
NRDC court indicated its willingness to defer to congressional judg-
ment if Congress had stated whether NEPA should have a unilateral
extraterritorial application.178
170. Id. at 761.
171. Id. The court also based its decision on the Foley Doctrine. Id. at 758-59.
172. 647 F.2d 1345, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
173. Id. at 1356-57.
174. Id. at 1366.
175. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98 (applying a balancing test which
weighed United States interests against the foreign sovereign's interests); Timberlane,
549 F.2d at 614 (applying a balancing test that related to United States foreign pol-
icy); supra notes 129-148 and accompanying text (discussing case law that considered
the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws).
176. NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1357. The court per Judge Wilkey said, "[w]e do honor
to the sovereignty of national governments, our own included, when we respect foreign
public policy by not automatically displacing theirs with ours." Id.
177. Compare Greenpeace, 748 F.Supp. at 759 (noting that NEPA was intended to
be applied in a manner consistent with United States foreign policy), with NRDC, 647
F.2d at 1367 (noting that congressional intent to apply NEPA extraterritorially in a
unilateral manner is obscure).
178. NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1357. The NRDC court stated that the lack of effect in
the United States or the lack of involvement by a United States national would restrict
this deference. Id. Judge Wilkey stated:
But whatever the wisdom of restraining the extraterritorial grasp of this country
in order to align ourselves with principles of international law, it would shrink
before an unequivocal mandate from Congress. Where a statute directs an
agency of the United States to consider foreign environmental impacts no court
of the United States will contravene the will of Congress. The only exception
would be if the legislature were wholly without jurisdiction to prescribe the rele-
vant conduct: this would occur only if that conduct occurred outside the territory
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3. The Endangered Species Act
Congress explicitly intended for the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) 79 to apply extraterritorially. The United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota, in Defenders of the Wildlife v. Hodel,80
reached this conclusion based on the plain meaning of the statute.181
Unlike the court in Mitchell, which found the MMPA's language
vague and all-inclusive, the Wildlife court found the ESA's language
specific in designating which portions of the law applied
extraterritorially.1
8 2
The Eighth Circuit recently affirmed the district court's ruling.
1 83
The court refused to defer to the Secretary of Interior's interpretation
of the ESA in light of the explicit congressional intent.184 The Secre-
tary opposed the ESA's extraterritorial application because of the po-
tential for interference with foreign nations' sovereignty and interfer-
ence with foreign relations. 85 The Eighth Circuit rejected the
Secretary's argument on several grounds. First, a foreign government
could apply for the ESA's exemption provision.' 86 Second, Congress
aimed the ESA at governmental actions rather than acts of foreign sov-
ereigns.1 87 And third, Congress rather than the courts should balance
the foreign policy issues against the concerns for wildlife.' 88
of the United States, had - or was intended to have - no effects within the
United States, or involved no conduct of nationals of the United States.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
179. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 402 (1990).
180. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989), affid sub
nom., Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir.
1990), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2008 (1991) (holding that under the
statutory language Congress intended to provide the ESA a worldwide application).
See Comment, Extraterritoriality and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 80 GEo.
L.J. 435, 444-49 (1991) (reading the Wildlife case narrowly as applying only to actions
of the United States government taken abroad).
181. Id. at 1084-86.
182. Id. at 1084-85. The court bolstered this conclusion by reference to a 1978
House conference report that endorsed the Department of Interior's global approach.
Id. at 1085-86. The court interpreted the report's language as a congressional "'stamp
of approval' of existing law and regulations governing section 7." Id. at 1086.
183. Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir.
1990).
184. Id. at 122-25. See Comment, The International Applicability of Section 7 of
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 171, 198-202 (1989)
(examining ESA and its amendments, and concluding that "section 7 does not draw
geographical boundaries").
185. Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 124-25.
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As with the application of antitrust laws overseas, Congress made
clear its intent that ESA be applied extraterritorially thereby protect-
ing these statutes from an attack under the Foley Doctrine. The pro-
posed Waste Export Control Act overcomes this judicial presumption
as the bill's legislative record and plain meaning clearly indicate a
strong congressional intent to regulate waste extraterritorially.' 89
Before receiving full extraterritorial application, however, a statute
must still fulfill the Effect Doctrine's requirements.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE WASTE EXPORT CONTROL ACT
A. WECA SUBSTANTIALLY STRENGTHENS THE EPA's CONTROL
OVER WASTE EXPORTS
WECA mandates EPA oversight for almost all solid waste exports 90
and provides for oversight of the waste during both transport and dis-
posal."' Congress requires the executive branch to promulgate explic-
itly detailed international agreements, which incorporate WECA's pro-
visions."' WECA establishes a standard for disposing American waste
189. See WECA at § 2(b)(1)(C) (requiring the implementation of bilateral agree-
ments allowing the United States access to treatment, storage, or disposal facilities
used in a receiving country).
190. WECA at § 12001(a)(1). WECA incorporates the definition of "solid waste"
used in Section 1004(27) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), 42 U.S.C. §
6903(27) (1988) (under this definition, "'solid waste' means any garbage...
WECA at § 12001(a)(1) WECA exempts
waste paper, glass cullet, metal, or plastic that (A) has been separated from solid
waste before export, (B) is exported for incorporation into new products with
recycled content, and (C) is not a hazardous waste listed or identified under
section 3001 [SWDA § 3001, 42 U.S.C. § 6921].
Id.
191. WECA at § 12002(b). In addition to preserving the HSWA provisions of noti-
fication and consent (WECA at § 12002(b)(l)(A) and (B)), any future international
agreement, which authorized waste export, must include: (1) a provision for the ex-
change of information (WECA at § 12002(b)(1)(C)); (2) mechanisms providing
United States inspectors access to treatment, storage, or disposal facilities in the receiv-
ing country (WECA at § 12002 (b)(1)(C)); (3) a provision for coordinated compliance
and enforcement of the agreement (WECA at § 12002(b)(1)(D)); (4) a provision for
regular review of the agreement's effectiveness (WECA at § 12002(b)(1)(E) and (F));
and (5) a provision for prohibiting further solid waste export where the agreement has
not been followed (WECA at § 12002(b)(l)(G)).
192. WECA at § 2(b) (requiring that solid waste exports be conducted in accor-
dance with an international agreement fulfilling the detailed mandates of WECA). The
Executive has two years after WECA's enactment to comply with the EPA's export
program. WECA at § 12002(b)(2). WECA does not provide judicial review of the
executive's decision not to enter into an international agreement. WECA at §
12002(b)(3). After this two year period, WECA voids any international agreement
that fails to comply with these mandates. WECA at § 12002(b)(2). During this two
year period, WECA deems existing international agreements as complying with its re-
quirements, thus allowing time for renegotiation. WECA at § 12002(b)(2) See Sub-
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abroad that is at least as stringent as the applicable domestic standard
for that waste. 1 3 WECA also delegates broad authority to the EPA
Administrator to issue exemptions, 94 to promulgate regulations defin-
ing its parameters, 195 and to exercise discretion in applying its provi-
sions.' Furthermore, WECA contains criminal, civil, and administra-
tive penalties,19 7 giving the Act the "teeth" that RCRA and HSWA
lack.
WECA's use of international agreements may arguably alleviate the
need for extraterritorial jurisdiction because the agreements could
grant consent to jurisdiction. International agreements, however, are
subject to negotiation, and in their final format may not include
comms. on Human Rights, and International Policy, supra note 49, at 19 (statement
of Reps. Miller and Conyers) (describing how the State Department and the EPA
would negotiate an agreement with a potential receiving country).
When exercising its power to regulate exports under article I section 8 of the Consti-
tution, or when exercising its appropriations power under article I section 9, Congress
often enters the realm of foreign relations normally reserved for the executive branch.
Rogers, The Constitution And Foreign Affairs: Two Hundred Years, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L. 894, 898 (1989); Trimble, The President's Foreign Affairs Power, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L. 750, 757 (1989); Note, Beyond Institutional Competence: Congressional Efforts To
Legislate United States Foreign Policy Toward Nicaragua - The Boland Amend-
ments, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 131, 162 (1988). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (stating
that "The Congress shall have the Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations [and] . . . To define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Na-
tions. . ."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (stating that "[n]o Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law"). See also
U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President "shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties ... and he shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls . . ."); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that the
President "shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers . . ."); United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (articulating the source of the
Executive's foreign relations power as inherent in the "delicate, plenary and exclusive
power of the President").
193. See WECA at § 2(b) (requiring that solid waste exports be conducted in ac-
cordance with an international agreement fulfilling the detailed mandates of WECA).
194. WECA at § 12001(a)(2).
195. WECA at §§ 12001(c)(5), 12003(b)(16), 120030) and 12004(a).
196. WECA at §§ 12002(b)(1)(C), 12003(d), 12003(f), 12003(h), 12003(k)-(m),
and 12006(c).
197. WECA at § 12006. Any person in violation of WECA can be civilly liable for
up to $25,000 for each violation for each day in violation. WECA at § 12006(b). When
the exporter "knowingly" violates WECA, criminal penalties may include fines, up to
two years imprisonment, or both. WECA at § 12006(a). A second criminal conviction
doubles the maximum punishment possible. WECA at § 12006(a). The Administrator,
upon finding a violation, may issue an order which mandates immediate compliance.
WECA at § 12006(c). As an alternative, the Administrator may commence a civil
action, which may include a temporary or permanent injunction. WECA at § 12006(c).
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WECA's total incorporation of domestic waste disposal standards.95
Furthermore, the ongoing revision of American standards and the dis-
cretion granted to the EPA Administrator will permit American regu-
latory officials to actively and uniformly apply domestic standards be-
yond the United States borders.19 9 WECA's international agreements
mandate uniform domestic standards and therefore require extraterri-
torial jurisdiction.
B. EXPANDING THE REACH OF WECA EXTRATERRITORIALLY
UNDER THE EFFECTS DOCTRINE
As in the ESA,200 WECA's statutory language and legislative history
clearly indicate strong congressional intent to apply it extraterritori-
ally.20' Such strong evidence of congressional intent should survive the
judicial hurdle of the Foley Doctrine.20 2 The ultimate success of
WECA in reaching beyond the United States borders then depends on
the second hurdle presented by the Effects Doctrine.
1. Congressional Intent To Apply WECA Extraterritorially
WECA includes provisions for United States officials to gain access
to treatment, storage, or disposal facilities in a receiving country203 in
order to make a thorough and independent determination that the facil-
ities comply with American standards. 0 WECA's requirement that
198. See note 7 and accompanying text (stating that WECA's standards are "no
less strict than that which would be required by the Solid Waste Disposal Act if the
waste were managed in the United States").
199. See Subcomms. on Human Rights, and International Policy, supra note 49,
at 2-3 (statement of Rep. Yatron) (explaining that the extraterritorial reach will only
apply to private companies abroad and not to foreign governments).
200. See supra notes 179-188 and accompanying text (concluding that Congress
clearly intended the ESA to have an extraterritorial application).
201. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (discussing
explicit statutory language that demonstrated Congress' intent in calculating pay under
the Jones Act); Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 613 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that
the ESA's express statutory language indicates when an act of conservation is author-
ized); Defenders of Wildlife, 707 F. Supp. at 1084-86 (explaining the statutory lan-
guage's role in judicial interpretation of legislation).
202. See Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 1003 (concluding that the court would interpret the
MMPA as restricted by the Foley Doctrine because the MMPA's statutory language
and legislative history did not indicate congressional intent to extraterritorially apply
the MMPA).
203. WECA at §§ 12002(b)(1)(C), 12003(k)(l)(B) (pursuant to a bilateral
agreement).
204. WECA at § 12003(0.
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EPA inspectors make the above determination in the receiving country
encourages the EPA to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. 20 5
Beyond WECA's plain meaning, the bill's legislative history offers
additional evidence of congressional intent to apply it extraterritori-
ally.2 °0 When congressional intent is clear, United States courts will-
ingly defer to this intent.20 7 WECA's drafters envisioned the need for
EPA inspectors to travel to foreign facilities.208 The drafters also recog-
nized that by reserving the right for EPA inspectors to conduct on-site
inspections within the receiving country, the issue of sovereign integrity
would arise.20 9
2. Application Of The Effects Doctrine
The courts make an exception to the judicial deference to Congress
when the prescribed conduct either has no effect, or has no intended
effect within the United States, or alternatively, when the prescribed
conduct does not involve United States nationals. 210 As a practical mat-
ter, the courts have eliminated these exceptions by freely implying
intent.211
WECA addresses environmental effects of global proportions. 1 2
Under the Effects Doctrine, United States courts have held that the
205. WECA at § 12002(b)(1)(C).
206. See Subcomms. on Human Rights and International Policy, supra note 49, at
1-5 (statement of Rep. Yatron) (discussing the background leading to WECA's
introduction).
207. NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1357.
208. Telephone interview with Shiela Cash Canavan, Professional Staff, Subcom-
mittee on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources, Committee on Government
Operations, United States House of Representatives (Jan. 14, 1991). As a model for
inspections abroad, the drafters used the Food and Drug Administration's staff of forty
that inspects foreign drug manufacturing facilities importing to the United States. Id.
WECA would not need nearly as many EPA inspectors to travel since eighty percent of
American waste is exported to thirteen Canadian facilities. Id.
209. See Subcomm. on Trans. and Hazmat, supra note 3, at 218 (statement of
Rep. Wolpe) (expressing concern about the sovereignty of receiving countries); Sub-
comms. on Human Rights, and International Policy, supra note 49, at 19-20 (state-
ments of Reps. Gejdenson, Miller, and Wolpe) (same); id. at 22 (letter from D.H.
Burney, Canadian Ambassador to the United States, to Rep. Gejdenson) (same).
210. NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1357.
211. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (illuminating the practice of im-
puting intent from conduct and other circumstantial evidence).
212. In comparison, ESA reaches many harmful effects through its extraterritorial
reach. Brief of Amici Curiae Ecotropica Foundation of Brazil, Slovak Union of Nature
and Landscape Protectors, Fundacion de Parques Nacionales of Costa Rica, and
Greenpeace International in support of Respondents at 12-19, Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, Friends of Animals, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, - U.S.
, 111 S.Ct. 2008 (1991) (No. 90-925). A few of the harmful domestic effects
averted by an extraterritorial application include: the loss of the United States and
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effects need only be substantial in order to justify extending jurisdiction
extraterritorially. 13 An analysis of prior events involving waste exports
illustrates the substantial effects that would justify WECA's extraterri-
torial application.
First, the absence of regulations over exported waste would result in
repeated fiascos like the one involving the Khian Sea.214 This incident
immediately effected the city of Philadelphia, forcing the city to scram-
ble for a new disposal site for its incinerator ash. Also, the Khian Sea
incident indirectly affected the EPA and the Department of State,
which expended significant resources to verify Coastal's attempts to se-
cure written consent from eleven potential receiving countries. 21 1 Sec-
ond, unregulated waste exports may detrimentally affect the United
States relations with other countries." 6 The S.S. Bark incident demon-
strated how easily an international incident can develop.217 And third,
the United States can claim environmental effect under an expanded
"circle of poison" theory.218 This theory acknowledges that we live in a
global environment in which toxins can return to their point of origin
through natural forces.219 Acid rain, disease, or the importation of food
products from a polluted country exemplify the tenets of this theory.
Congress acknowledged that acid rain, tropical deforestation, ozone de-
humankind's ability to sustain themselves; the loss of improved medical and agricul-
tural technology that genetic diversity offers; the "crashing" of ecosystems that depend
upon certain species; the damage to industry and markets dependent upon biological
products; and the loss of the intrinsic value animals offer. Id. These effects are espe-
cially acute given the irreparable nature of the potential injuries. Id. at 17. Further-
more, requiring the federal government to protect a species domestically while destroy-
ing it overseas is inherently inconsistent with the scheme of ESA and would undermine
its scope and usefulness in protecting domestic species. Id. at 19 n.36 (citing Foley, 336
U.S. at 286).
213. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 612-13; Consolidated Gold, 871 F.2d at 261-62. See
also RSTATEM ENT 3D, supra note 100, at comment d (qualifying that the effect must
be both substantial and foreseeable).
214. Subcomms. on Human Rights, and International Policy, supra note 49, at 4
(statement of Rep. Wolpe).
215. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text (discussing events surrounding
the Khian Sea incident).
216. See Subcomms. on Human Rights, and International Policy, supra note 49,
at 3-4 (statement of Rep. Wolpe) (warning that reckless dumping of American waste
will undermine the credibility of the United States as a world environmental leader,
and foster an image of being a toxic terrorist). See also Exporting Hazardous Indus-
tries, supra note 12, at 782-83 (defining any inaction by the United States as promot-
ing an image of callous indifference).
217. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the arrest of a Norwe-
gian official in connection with the S.S. Bark incident).
218. See Lutz, supra note 1, at 641 (hypothesizing that this theory is implicitly
behind most toxic waste export regulations); D. WEIrn & M. SHAPIRO, CIRCLE OF
POISON (1981) (explaining more fully the "circle of poison" theory).
219. Id. at 641 n.41.
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pletion, and ocean dumping will eventually affect individuals in the
United States regardless of the origin of the pollution. 2 '
In addition to these environmental, political, and financial effects,
another factor encourages the extension of jurisdiction abroad - re-
sponsibility for the waste America produces. The United States govern-
ment's responsibility for American waste is similar to its responsibility
for its nationals. The government clearly has authority to control its
nationals' extraterritorial acts.221 On a higher level, the United States
may have a moral responsibility to control, regardless of national bor-
ders, the waste it generates.222 As the greatest producer and exporter of
waste, the United States bears the greatest burden in seeking ways to
control the transboundary movement of waste.
As in antitrust law, the court must balance each sovereign's inter-
ests. 23 In weighing these interests, the courts must consider many fac-
tors, including: whether the receiving country has any conflicting envi-
ronmental laws; the exporter's nationality; whether the illegal act
resulted from an export or a re-export from a third country; the possi-
ble effects on foreign relations if the exporting company or receiving
facilities are affiliated with the receiving country's government; to what
extent the receiving country will enforce the complicated provisions of
RCRA; whether the United States would grant reciprocity to the re-
ceiving country's environmental laws; and whether the bilateral agree-
ments promulgated under the WECA include provisions covering the
many contingencies that could arise.22
The Timberlane balancing test also examines the nature of the pro-
posed extraterritorial intrusion.225 The drafters designed WECA to pro-
tect not only the United States environment, but also the global envi-
ronment.226 Thus, a foreign sovereign may welcome this extension of
220. Subcomms. on Human Rights, and International Policy, supra note 49, at 3
(statement of Rep. Yatron). While the transboundary movement of solid waste may
not cause deforestation, it can increase the frequency and magnitude of acid rain,
ozone depletion, and ocean dumping. Id.
221. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); RESTATEMENT 3D, supra
note 100, at § 402(2).
222. Subcomms. on Human Rights, and International Policy, supra note 49 (state-
ment of Rep. Wolpe).
223. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98 (adopting the Timberlane bal-
ancing test).
224. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (detailing the six factors of the
Timberlane test).
225. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98 (expanding the Timberlane test
to include this consideration).
226. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text (explaining that under the
"circle of poison" theory the United States would be protecting its own environment
and the health of its own citizens by protecting the environments of other countries).
[VOL. 7:397
WASTE EXPORT CONTROL ACT
United States regulatory power, especially in those developing countries




Regardless of the motives of WECA's individual drafters, Congress
has compiled in WECA a comprehensive and practical solution to the
growing solid waste export problem.228 The drafters closed many of the
large regulatory gaps in the present American waste export laws. 229
Moreover, the bill grants the EPA Administrator significant discretion-
ary powers to implement and enforce the new regulations.2 30
Although the EPA has demonstrated its competency to regulate en-
vironmental standards, WECA thrusts the agency into an unfamiliar
227. See Exporting Hazardous Industries, supra note 12, at 781-82 (stating that
many developing countries give preferential treatment in an effort to stimulate their
economy but at the same time lack the resources to monitor, detect, and mitigate the
detrimental side effects from the imports). Compare Subcomms. on Human Rights.
and International Policy, supra note 49, at 22-24 (letter from D.H. Burney, Canadian
Ambassador to the United States, to Rep. Sam Gejdenson (D-Conn.)) (challenging the
presumption that Canadian standards fail to "ensure that waste is dealt with safely and
in an environmentally sound manner"); with id. at 25 (statement of Rep. Conyers)
(asserting that the United States very likely possesses greater scientific knowledge on
waste disposal than any other country).
228. Compare Subcomms. on Human Rights, and International Policy, supra note
49, at 25 (statement of Rep. Conyers) (advocating WECA's uniform global, i.e. Amer-
ican, standards as closing regulatory loop holes); and id. at 3-4 (statement of Rep.
Yatron) (viewing WECA as a means to reestablish the United States as a world envi-
ronmental leader, and prevent future international incidents from reaching crisis
levels); and id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Yatron) (warning that the condition of the
environment halfway around the world will affect individuals living in the United
States); and Subcomm. on Trans. and Hazmat, supra note 3, at 217 (statement of
Rep. Wolpe) (pointing out that WECA, by creating disincentives for hazardous waste
manufacturers, will contribute to source reduction); with id. at 219 (statement of Rep.
Luken) (stating that WECA would be "totally consistent" with the Basel Convention
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
which many other countries have ratified).
229. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text (discussing how WECA regu-
lates almost all solid waste exports, tracks the export beyond United States borders,
provides for verification, and guarantees that the waste was properly disposed).
Another alternative to WECA that would close all regulatory gaps in the export laws
would be a total ban on exports. This is the approach advocated by Representative Ed
Towns (D-NY) in his proposed Waste Export and Import Prohibition Act. H.R. 2580,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
230. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text (listing WECA's provisions
that grant discretion to the Administrator to issue exemptions as well as criminal, civil.
or administrative penalties); Mounteer, Codifying Basel Convention Obligations Into
U.S. Law: The Waste Export Control Act, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10085, 10098 (Envtl. L.
Inst. Feb. 1991) [hereinafter Mounteer] (concluding that the export permit provisions
of WECA would provide EPA with a powerful tool for guaranteeing proper disposal of
American solid waste overseas).
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foreign affairs role. Along with the State Department, the EPA must
negotiate international agreements with potential receiving countries.
2 31
The EPA must also maintain the authority to send inspectors to facili-
ties in receiving countries. 2  Consequently, diplomacy will become
more important than the EPA's improved regulatory strength. 3
WECA's flexible discretionary provisions will aid the Administrator
to make the necessary case by case determinations. The EPA, however,
lacks the necessary competence in foreign policy.234 To successfully en-
force WECA, the EPA must develop a close working relationship with
231. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing international agree-
ments under WECA). By incorporating the American domestic standards into an inter-
national agreement, WECA has effectively ratified the substantive provisions of the
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal (Basel Convention). Subcomm. on Trans. and Hazmat, supra note
3, at 219 (statements of Reps. Luken and Wolpe). The Basel Convention adopted a
notification and consent system similar to HSWA, and a manifest system similar to
RCRA. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Haz-
ardous Wastes and Their Disposal, adopted and opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989,
reprinted in UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, BASEL CONVENTION ON
THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE AND THEIR
DISPOSAL: FINAL ACT, also reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989). See also Mounteer,
supra note 226, at 10098 (describing WECA's standard of "no less strict" as similar
but less nebulous than the Basel Convention's standard of "environmentally sound
management"). The current version of WECA, H.R. 2358, would explicitly implement
the Basel Convention pending ratification by the Senate. Interview with English, supra
note 4.
After prodding by Congress, the Bush Administration submitted the Basel Conven-
tion to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on May 17, 1991. Leich,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 668, 674-79 (1991). See H. Con. Res. 88, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (in-
troduced by Rep. Clinger (R-PA) on April 6, 1989) (urging the President to sign and
submit the Basel Convention to the Senate).
WECA would actually go further since it adopts a stronger standard than the one
finally adopted by the Basel Convention:
There are indications that the United States was largely responsible for watering
down the [Basel Convention] in a number of important areas. Under the final
version, exporting nations must require that their wastes are managed in an envi-
ronmentally sound manner, whereas in earlier drafts exporting nations had to
ensure that their wastes were managed in a manner no less environmentally
sound than the manner in which they would have been treated domestically.
Subcomms. on Human Rights, and International Policy, supra note 49, at 2 (state-
ment of Rep. Gejdenson). See also Mounteer at 10,092-93 (relating how WECA incor-
porates a stricter standard than the one Bush Administration negotiators successfully
removed from the Basel Convention); Exports to Canada, supra note 35, at 10,065
n.58 (describing an earlier version of WECA as a de facto ban on waste exports).
232. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text (discussing access to foreign
facilities).
233. See Third Restatement, supra note 123, at 151 (suggesting that international
conflicts would be better resolved through good-faith diplomatic efforts rather than uni-
lateral balancing by one state).
234. See ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 9, at 32-33 (stating that there have
been problems in the past where the State Department has been unable to "turn off
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the Department of State.213 This alliance may require either a liaison
office within the EPA, or the appointment of an at-large United States
Ambassador to the Environment. Either option could resolve the fore-
seeable conflicts that will arise between the EPA, whose goals are regu-
lation of waste exports and protection of the environment, and the De-
partment of State, whose goal is to facilitate the executive's broader
foreign policy objectives. The interagency decision making process itself
should be modeled after the balancing tests developed by the judiciary
and articulated in Timberlane Lumber, Mannington Mills, and De-
fenders of the Wildlife.23 6
CONCLUSION
WECA grants the EPA broad powers, which classifies the EPA as
ad hoc protector of the global environment. WECA equips the EPA
with enforcement provisions and funding that often guarantee the suc-
cess of federal programs. 2 7 As the case law reveals, the application of
domestic laws and standards extraterritorially often implicates foreign
policy considerations.2 38 Therefore, as the EPA enters the realm of in-
ternational relations, diplomacy will become more important than the
strength of its enforcement powers. The program's ultimate success will
depend on the EPA's moderate use of its new powers on a case by case
basis, while remaining conscious of its potential for transforming the
diplomatically damaging extraterritorial law enforcement, by semi-independent U.S.
regulatory and prosecution agencies").
235. Cf. Leak in the System, supra note 6, at 10,174 (noting that Congress origi-
nally intended the EPA and the United States Customs Service to work together in
implementing and enforcing HSWA, but in practice rarely have).
236. See supra notes 129-44 and accompanying text (applying antitrust laws extra-
territorially); supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text (applying the Endangered
Species Act extraterritorially). But see Third Restatement, supra note 123, at 149-52
(cautioning that the adversarial process that permits a somewhat impartial balancing
by the judicial branch does not exist within the politically sensitive legislative and exec-
utive branches).
The assumption is that the Department of State would take an impartial role and
introduce the concerns of foreign countries into the decision-making process. In the
past, executive agencies have often neglected to balance the interests of other countries
against their own. See id. at 143-44 (recalling the United States Department of Com-
merce and United States Export Administration's efforts to inhibit the construction of
the Soviet trans-Siberian pipeline against the sharp criticism of a unified European
Economic Community).
237. See supra notes 190-97 and accompanying text (detailing the strictness of
WECA).
238. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98 (listing foreign policy as one of
many considerations in whether to give a law extraterritorial application); Timberlane,
549 F.2d at 614 (same).
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United States into an environmental imperialist. 39 As the vast majority
of the solid waste exported to other nations originates in the United
States, WECA represents the government's acknowledgement of its re-
sponsibility for environmental damage within another sovereign's
borders.240
239. See Rublack, Controlling Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste:
The Evolution of a Global Convention, 13 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 113, 122 (1989)
(observing that it is "difficult to delineate between paternalistic restrictions on hazard-
ous exports and a state's legitimate power to control its exports for reasons such as its
foreign relations").
240. See Nanda & Bailey, Export of Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Technol-
ogy: Challenge for International Environmental Law, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
155, 159-60 (1988) (suggesting that states be held responsible for conditions that could
foreseeably cause harm to another state, like hazardous waste exports, under customary
international law).
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